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Reassessing Kant’s Geography 
Stuart Elden 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article offers a critical reassessment of Immanuel Kant’s lectures on 
Physische Geographie and his contribution to geographical thought more 
generally. There are a number of reasons why this reassessment is needed: 
the lectures are finally about to be published in English translation; careful 
philological work in German has exposed how corrupted the standard text of 
the lectures is; and philosophers are finally beginning to critically integrate an 
understanding of the Geography into their overall assessment of Kant’s work. 
English speaking geographers will therefore soon have access to the lectures 
in a way that they have not done before, but they need to be aware both of 
the problems of the edition being translated and the work philosophers have 
undertaken on their situation in Kant’s work and their impact. More broadly, 
the reassessment requires us to reconsider the position Kant occupies in 
geography as a discipline as a whole. The article examines the history of the 
lectures and their publication in some detail; discusses Kant’s purpose in 
giving them; and looks at the way in which he structured geographical 
knowledge and understood its relation to history and philosophy. In terms of 
the broader focus particular attention is given to the topics of race and space. 
While these lectures are undoubtedly of largely historical interest, it is for 
precisely that reason that an examination of them and Kant’s thought more 
generally is of relevance today to the history of the discipline of geography. 
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Introduction 
 
Immanuel Kant’s lectures on Physische Geographie were first published over 
two hundred years ago. They were discussed by Richard Hartshorne in his 
comprehensive study of the discipline of geography almost seventy years ago, 
a survey that has formed the basis for most accounts of Kant’s text since.1 
The most comprehensive study in English—J.A. May’s book—is almost forty 
years old.2 So why look again at Kant’s views on geography? There are four 
main reasons. 
 
The first is that the lectures on geography are far more talked about than 
read. The first full English translation of Kant’s Physical Geography is due to 
appear in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in the near 
future, in the volume on ‘Natural Science’.3 Although parts of the lectures 
have been available in English since the late 1960s,4 this will undoubtedly 
make these lectures far more widely available. What are these lectures about, 
and how might we assess their claims today? 
 
The second is that even this version of the lectures needs to be treated with 
caution. It is unfortunate that even after such a long wait the English 
audience is going to have to contend with a problematic edition. Alongside a 
contextualisation of the lectures, they need a warning about their status. The 
complicated lineage of the lectures will be discussed below, but for the 
moment it suffices to say that the text being translated is corrupted, and that 
it may well obscure parts of Kant’s intent. What are these complications and 
how might this mislead? 
 
The other two reasons are perhaps the most important. Third, these lectures 
and related writings are now beginning to receive critical attention in English 
language Kant scholarship. More detail is provided below, but the basic claim 
is that just as Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View has been 
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reconsidered over the past decade or so, the Geography deserves and is 
beginning to receive similar work.  
 
Fourth, just as in recent years scholarship has begun to recognise the 
complexity of Kant’s ideas of some key topics, notably race, so too does his 
view of space need to be rethought. All-too-often Kant is held up as an 
instance of views that he did not actually hold or was explicitly critiquing. 
Moving from Kant’s Geography to Kant’s geography more generally, we need 
to consider his position in the tradition more carefully. 
 
Back in 1939, Hartshorne noted Erich Adickes’s assessment of the lectures 
and agreed that ‘for geography today… Kant’s work is of little more than 
historical interest’.5 This paper does not seek to suggest that reading Kant 
today will radicalize the discipline, and this is not an attempt to rehabilitate 
Kant. Rather it suggests that reassessing Kant might be a useful moment in a 
broader reconsideration of the history of geography, and certainly of the place 
of Kant within it. Thus this interpretation takes issue with the ‘little more’ 
element of the Adickes/Hartshorne assessment, suggesting that its historical 
interest is precisely why we should look at it today. As Livingstone suggests, 
‘the history of geography is the history of a contested tradition’.6 Given that 
this is true of the history of ideas more generally, and philosophy especially, 
their point of collision in Kant is a significant marker. As philosophers begin 
the work of integrating these materials into their overall assessment of Kant’s 
work, geographers too should reconsider his views in light of the history of 
the discipline. Yet rather than do as Hartshorne himself suggests, and 
privilege Kant’s other writings over the Physical Geography, which he 
suggests should be relegated to a ‘historical footnote’, this reading begins 
with the lectures.7 What do these lectures, and following them Kant’s writings 
on issues of concern to geographers more generally, add to our 
understanding of Kant’s geography today? 
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Immanuel Kant’s Geography Lectures 
 
Kant lectured on a variety of topics during his career at the University of 
Königsberg. These included both philosophical and non-philosophical topics. 
The lecture courses were often well attended and gained a strong reputation. 
Many of these courses have come down to us from Kant’s own manuscripts or 
from student transcripts. Today these lectures are part of his complete works, 
and are invaluable sources of knowledge concerning his work, its substance, 
coherence and development. Standard philosophical subjects such logic, 
metaphysics and ethics were part of his normal program, but Kant also gave 
courses on anthropology and physical geography on a regular basis. Initially it 
was geography alone, but from the mid 1770s geography was usually offered 
in the summer semester while anthropology was given in the winter. In total 
geography was offered forty-nine times over a forty-year period from 1756-
96—more frequently than any of his other topics other than logic and 
metaphysics.8  
 
Yet Kant never produced a book from these lectures. The course on 
anthropology was worked up into a book by Kant himself, entitled 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.9 The initial print-run was for 
the largest number of copies any book of his produced in his lifetime.10 In 
Kant’s words the Anthropology was ‘the present [i.e. the final] manual for my 
anthropology course’.11 It seems that had Kant more time, he would have 
produced a volume of the geography lectures himself. But he remarked in 
1798 that a version of them was ‘scarcely possible’ at his own advanced age, 
for the manuscript he used to lecture was one he believed only he could 
read.12 Shortly after this comment, the first volume of an edition by Gottfried 
Vollmer was produced, apparently based on transcripts of lectures from 1778, 
1782 and 1793, but this was described by Kant as unauthorized and 
illegitimate, of which he did not recognize ‘either the material or the format’ 
as his.13 This is hardly surprising: much of the work is not Kant’s and this is 
not made clear in the edition itself; and there is certainly far more material 
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than could ever have been given in a single semester. The semi-authorized 
version which was then rushed out in 1802, two years before Kant’s death, 
was compiled by Friedrich Theodor Rink, utilizing lectures from 1759, with the 
introduction from a mid 1770s course, and is much less extensive.14 Rink 
claims that he has based this on three notebooks of Kant’s, but he 
unquestionably means student transcripts.15 Adickes thinks the first part is 
from 1775, and demonstrates that the text is unreliable in that Rink added 
notes, and altered or dropped passages of which he could not make sense.16 
Werner Stark has noted that the first half (which he dates to 1774) is much 
more closely edited, with additions and references, while the second half 
reproduces Kant’s text almost verbatim, even allowing a gap in the text (the 
omission of India and East Asian islands in the survey) to remain.17 Rink 
alludes to some of the reasons for this uneven treatment in his introduction to 
the lectures.18 His promised revised edition, putting good the problems, never 
actually appeared. Vollmer’s edition came out in an eventual four volumes, in 
seven parts in total, and was completed in 1805. 
 
It is the Rink edition that is today known as the Physische Geographie, later 
incorporated into the Akademie Ausgabe of Kants gesammelte Schriften [the 
Academy Edition of Kant’s Collected Writings].19 This is the one that 
Hartshorne utilizes, and that almost all accounts in English refer to, either first 
or second hand. Yet the dates of the materials used should give us cause to 
pause. Kant gave lectures on this topic from 1756 until 1796, and his 
comment that only he could read the text in 1798 indicates that he never 
ceased to revise it over that period. The text we have takes the introductory 
materials from a mid-period course (1774 or 1775) and bolts them onto the 
body of very early lectures (1759). At the time of the early lectures, 
anthropology was not yet being offered as a separate course, and some of 
the materials for that came from the geography lectures. By way of context, 
Kant’s mature philosophy is said to begin with the Critique of Pure Reason, 
first published in 1781.20 Nobody seeking to understand Kant’s considered 
views on morality, ontology, logic, physics, or, indeed, anthropology, would 
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content themselves with ‘pre-critical’ works.21 Yet that is what is usually done 
with the lectures on geography. 
 
In the early twentieth century Adickes attempted to get the Akademie 
Ausgabe to produce a new version of the Geography, instead of relying on 
Rink’s, but this was declined due to feasibility: the volume was already 
typeset. The forthcoming Volume XXVI of Akademie edition will include 
several transcriptions of the lectures, prepared by the historian of philosophy 
Werner Stark;22 and Volume XIV includes notes on geography, along with 
mathematics, physics and chemistry.23 Yet unfortunately the forthcoming 
English translation is of the Rink edition. This is certainly better than nothing 
but it is interesting again to contrast this with the Anthropology, which has 
been available in English for several years in a reliable edition, with 
translations in 1974 and 1978 and an entirely new recent translation by 
Robert Louden with extensive notes from Kant’s manuscript and a long 
introduction;24 along with forthcoming editions of variant lectures and note 
materials.25 
 
There are thus serious philological difficulties relating to reading the 
geography lectures that go far beyond their inaccessibility in English. Stark 
has done invaluable work in ordering and organizing these lectures, following 
his work on the lectures on ethics and anthropology, setting them in their 
historical context and showing the variation across time.26 His transcriptions 
of the handwritten student transcripts are a major work in themselves. For 
many purposes the most accessible edition of the lectures is the French, 
which although it is a translation of the Rink edition includes an extensive 
introduction and a brief appendix of variants from other years.27 This is the 
text used by David Harvey, whose reading is discussed below. 
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The Neglect 
 
Of all of Kant’s work, and of all his wide areas of interest, the neglect of 
geography is perhaps the most glaring. It generally merits an entry in 
dictionaries of Kant’s work, but these tend to be pretty brief.28 There is no 
explicit discussion in the recent A Companion to Kant,29 and a recent edited 
book on Kant and the Sciences makes only a tangential reference to 
geography.30 Robert Hanna’s comprehensive study, Kant, Science, and 
Human Nature, makes only two passing references to geography and offers 
no sustained engagement.31 Many other accounts on related topics are 
similar.32 The same neglect can be found in works concentrating on Kant’s 
theories of space.33 And while the work on anthropology has been discussed 
by figures of the stature of Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault,34 the 
Geography has not received anything like the same amount of attention. 
 
Aside from the textual problems, one of the reasons is that philosophers have, 
by and large, not known what to make of the works. This is demonstrated in 
debates about where the anthropology lectures might be placed in editions of 
Kant’s work. If it seems unquestionably the case that today the anthropology 
and geography belong together, this has not always been the view. Wilhelm 
Dilthey and Erdmann argued that their relation was to the cosmology and 
physical geography; while Emil Arnoldt and Adickes claimed that they were 
linked to the metaphysics lectures and the section on empirical psychology.35 
This confusion might appear surprising, since Erdmann shows that parts of 
the Anthropology derived from earlier lectures on geography, and Kant goes 
out of his way to demonstrate the linked nature of the inquiries.36 Yet there is 
a certainly a link to the metaphysics lectures. Holly Wilson suggests the 
following view: 
 
I distinguish between ‘origin’ and ‘arise’: the anthropology 
lectures arose out of the psychology lectures, but had their 
origin in the physical geography lectures. Kant’s banning of 
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psychology from metaphysics initiated the movement toward an 
independent series of lectures on anthropology, but the intent 
and content of the anthropology lectures finds its origin in the 
physical geography lecture, which were initially given fifteen 
years prior to the start of the anthropology lectures.37 
 
Those that do discuss the work on geography do, sometimes, note its relation 
to wider concerns in Kant’s work. Howard Caygill, for instance, in his Kant 
Dictionary says that ‘in addition to this explicit treatment of geography in his 
lectures, it is interesting to note Kant’s reliance on geographical terms and 
metaphors in his more strictly defined philosophical work’.38 But this is as far 
as his link goes, perhaps understandable given the nature of his project, but 
shared much more generally. However, in recent years a number of people 
have begun to analyse Kant’s work on Anthropology in a new light, which 
necessarily forces an encounter with the Geography. These would include 
Robert Louden’s Kant’s Impure Ethics, John Zammito’s Kant, Herder, and the 
Birth of Anthropology,39 and Holly Wilson’s Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology. In 
addition Cambridge University Press has recently published a useful book of 
essays on the anthropology,40 and there is an exceptional recent biography by 
Manfred Kuehn which, together with Eckart Förster and Peter Fenves’s 
pioneering work on the late Kant, enables a much more nuanced situation of 
the geographical work.41 It is in the light of these researches, alongside those 
of Robert Bernasconi and David Harvey on race discussed below, that a 
reassessment can begin. 
 
Kant’s Pragmatic Purpose 
 
Why did Kant lecture on geography? Although it became one of his most 
attended courses, this does not explain things sufficiently. Wilson is valuable 
in tracking the changing objectives for the geography lectures, suggesting 
that initially they were ‘purely scientific, that is, to make a more certain 
knowledge of believable travel accounts, and to make this into a legitimate 
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academic course of study’.42 But the popularity of the course meant that Kant 
could begin to suggest that their aim could be ‘to civilise young students to 
become ‘citizens of the world’’.43 Zammito has similarly shown how the 
lectures are related to the Anthropology in providing knowledge, but stresses 
this is for a philosophical purpose.44 As Louden notes, therefore, their aim was 
more than merely scholastic, but rather: 
 
The anthropology and physical geography lectures are thus not 
primarily intended as further contributions to Kant’s critical, 
transcendental philosophy program… [which] was not his only 
concern. A major portion of Kant’s teaching activity was devoted 
to trying to enlighten his students more about the people and 
world around them in order that they might live (pragmatically 
as well as morally) better lives.45 
 
For Louden, anthropology and geography are thus ‘intersecting halves of a 
larger whole’.46 The problematic link between Kant’s views on geography and 
anthropology, and, especially, on race and his cosmopolitan ethics will be 
discussed below, but the point here is somewhat different. This is that Kant 
sees these lectures as providing a broad knowledge of the world as a 
foundation to the more general studies of his students, and that together the 
physical geography and pragmatic anthropology give an empirical grounding 
for his thought more generally. In a postscript to his 1775 article ‘Von den 
verschiedenen Racen der Menschen [On the Different Races of Human 
Beings]’ Kant suggested that the two lecture courses together were 
Weltkenntnis.47 This would usually translate as ‘world-knowledge’, but Wilson 
has suggested the felicitous ‘cosmopolitan knowledge’, with ‘cosmopolitan 
philosophy’ for the related Weltwissenschaften.48 This knowledge of the 
world, for Kant, was integral to the moral and political life of the citizen. Both 
geography and anthropology were taught by Kant because of their ‘pragmatic’ 
dimension, the way in which this knowledge can guide us in our moral and 
practical life.  
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This world-knowledge, this cosmology, is essential to his other writings. Kant 
suggests that physical geography is about the world as an ‘object of external 
sense’; and anthropology as an ‘object of inner sense’.49 Indeed, in his essay 
on ‘The Conflict of the Faculties’, Kant divides the philosophy faculty into two 
parts—the one that deals with ‘pure rational knowledge’ and one that deals 
with ‘historical knowledge’. The former contains metaphysics of nature and 
morals, along with pure philosophy and mathematics; the latter includes 
history, geography, philology, the humanities and the empirical knowledge of 
the natural sciences.50 Of these aspects, physical geography is ‘the physical 
description of the earth’, ‘the first part of knowledge of the world’.51 Wilson is 
therefore clear that the lectures on anthropology must be seen as philosophy:  
 
Kant explicitly argues that the anthropology is a type of 
cosmopolitan philosophy. It is not a scholastic philosophy, and it 
is not critical philosophy, but it is a type of philosophy… 
The twofold field of physical geography and anthropology are 
viewed cosmologically and pragmatically. In other words, Kant 
considered these two disciplines, in the way he taught them, to 
be philosophy, and philosophy that was useful for the world.52 
 
These lectures were to serve as a propaedeutic for ‘practical reason’, and are 
a ‘history of the contemporary condition of the earth or geography, in the 
widest sense’.53 This, for Kant, is ‘the preliminary exercise in the knowledge of 
the world’.54 Knowledge of the world is thus of both ‘the human being and 
nature’.55 Physical geography studies nature, anthropology the human, but 
the latter outweighs the former, since ‘nature exists for the sake of the 
human being. The human being is the end of nature’.56 Nonetheless, the 
twofold field of Weltkenntis needs to be treated cosmologically.57 
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The Context and the Structure of the Geography 
 
Kant was an innovator in geography, if for no other reason that he was one of 
the very first to lecture on it as an explicit topic, before it was common to 
have chairs in geography in Germany. While others lectured on it in a way 
that was more akin to travel writing, Kant attempted to systematise the 
subject, synthesising insights from a range of different sources. Indeed, his 
outline for the course was unique, and he had to ask for special dispensation 
from the Minister of Education in order to give a course for which no textbook 
could be found.58 The latter was of the opinion that ‘the worst textbook is 
certainly better than none, and professors may, if they possess so much 
wisdom, improve upon their authors to the extent that they can, but the 
reading from notes must simply be stopped. From this we nevertheless make 
exception of Professor Kant and his course on Physical Geography, for which 
no appropriate textbook is yet available’. Kant’s own manuscript was known 
as the Diktattext, prepared around 1759 but much amended and now lost. 
The Holstein-Beck manuscript is believed to be the closest to Kant’s 
Diktattext. After Kant retired his colleague K. L. Pörschke used the text of 
George Henry Millar, The New and Universal System of Geography.59  
 
There is not the space here to outline how Kant’s understandings of specific 
geographical issues relate to knowledge at the time and to debates in a range 
of contexts since. This has been discussed at some length elsewhere.60 
Nonetheless Kant’s structure of the subject is important in itself and it is 
worth focussing on this. Initially his treatment included what was later 
separated out as the Anthropology. While ‘geography’ in the late 1700s meant 
something rather different to today, and crucially depended on where it was 
being taught or discussed,61 what is striking is that Kant is interested in 
establishing subdivisions within the broad topic, many of which bear similarity 
to subdisciplines today, even if others are obsolete. Kant is thus trying to 
move geography—not always successfully—beyond mere ‘earth description’.62 
Anton Friedrich Büsching’s Neue Erdbeschreibung (New Description of the 
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Earth) was, as Withers recounts, based on lectures given at Göttingen in the 
philosophy department, and published in eleven volumes between 1754-
1792.63 Kant too depends greatly on these kind of empirical examples, but he 
tries to situate this within a broad structure of the subject. It is notable that 
the structure of most of his geography courses is very similar, even as the 
content changes. Kant begins with an introduction which provides a general 
assessment of the subject and its relation to other topics; moves to a 
discussion of the mechanics of the earth and then breaks the substantive part 
of the analysis into three parts.  
 
The first substantial part of the text is the more accurately ‘physical 
geography’. It looks at a range of physical processes concerning earth and 
water: oceans; land and islands as examples of the earth and its terrain; 
earthquakes, volcanoes and electricity; springs and wells; rivers and water, 
wind currents; climate, the atmosphere and temperature; transformations of 
the earth; and seafaring. The second part concerns the three realms of 
nature: fauna, flora, and minerals. Many of the aspects of this second part 
would not fall within the remit of modern day geography, with the exception 
of biogeography. The final part of the book offers a regional geography of the 
world, with descriptions of particular regions and places in Asia, Africa, 
Europe and America. But Kant’s Physical Geography was also a moral and 
political account, and included human beings in it, usually just before the 
section on animals, discussing racial differences. In addition there are a range 
of comments in the third part concerning their geographical differentiation. 
Humans are thus seen as part of physical geography, both because they are 
one of the features of the Erdboden—the earth’s surface—but also because 
they a causal mechanism for change to the earth itself, because they build 
dams, drain swamps and fell forests, thus changing landscape and climate.64  
 
After a decade of lecturing, announcing his courses for Winter Semester 
1765-66, Kant outlined how his vision had developed, and how the more 
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explicitly physical geography could sometimes be underplayed. This is worth 
quoting at length:  
 
Since then I have gradually expanded this scheme, and now I 
propose, by condensing that part of the subject which is 
concerned with the physical features of the earth, to gain the 
time necessary for extending my course of lectures to include 
the other parts of the subject, which are of even greater utility. 
This discipline will therefore be a physical, moral and political 
geography. It will contain, first of all, a specification of the 
remarkable features of nature in three realms. The specification 
will, however, be limited to those features, among the 
innumerably many which could be chosen, which particularly 
satisfy the general desire for knowledge, either because of their 
rarity or the effect which they can exercise on states by means 
of trade and industry. This part of the subject, which also 
contains a treatment of the natural relationship which holds 
between all the lands and seas in the world, and the reason for 
their connection, is the essential foundation of all history. 
Without this foundation, history is scarcely distinguishable from 
fairy-tales.  
 
This is a point worth underlining. As Kant claims in the geography lectures, 
geography is the ground or foundation for history, as events necessarily take 
place somewhere, in some context.65 This is not to assert a priority for 
geography over history, but rather to insist on their relation together, a 
complementary analysis rather than a separation. Indeed, as Withers has 
noted, it was a commonplace at the time to see geography as the left ‘eye’ of 
history, with chronology as the right.66 
 
The second part of the subject considers human beings, 
throughout the world, from the point of view of the variety of 
  
14 
their natural properties and the differences in that feature of the 
human which is moral in character. The consideration of these 
things is at once very important and also highly stimulating as 
well. Unless these matters are considered, general judgments 
about man would scarcely be possible. The comparison of 
human beings with each other, and the comparison of the 
human today with the moral state of the human in earlier times, 
furnishes us with a comprehensive map of the human species. 
Finally, there will be a consideration of what can be regarded as 
a product of the reciprocal interaction of the two previously 
mentioned forces, namely, the condition of the states and 
nations throughout the world. The subject will not be considered 
so much from the point of view of the way in which the 
condition of states depends on accidental causes, such as the 
deeds and fates of individuals, for example, the sequence of 
governments, conquests and intrigues between states. The 
condition of states will rather be considered in relation to what 
is more constant and which contains the more remote ground of 
those accidental causes, namely, the situation of their countries, 
the nature of their products, customs, industry, trade and 
population.67 
 
Kant therefore sets out a range of distinctions—the physical, moral and 
political geography is alluded to here, but the actual analysis is rather more 
complicated. By the mid 1770s he offers a range of possibilities: 
 
 Physical geography: the foundation or ground for other types of 
geography as well as history—a general study or outline of nature; 
 Mathematical geography: concerned with the measure of the shape, 
size and motion of the earth, and its situation in the solar system; 
 Moral geography: the relation between moral codes and customs and 
regions, a kind of spatial differentiation; 
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 Political geography: the relation of political systems and political laws 
to physical features of geography, part of the reason why these are 
only nominally universal; 
 Commercial [Handlungs] geography: concerned with the geographical 
elements of trade in surplus products; 
 Theological geography: concerned with theological attitudes and 
principles and their relation to physical features of the landscape; again 
a form of spatial differentiation.68  
 
Kant’s humans thus move from being detached from the world into closer to 
relation with the earth, nature and other humans. As the material in the latter 
part developed this led to the parallel lectures on anthropology.69 What the 
lectures together provide is a grounding of empirical detail. Crucially though 
they try to provide a geographical perspective on a range of social, cultural 
and physical phenomena. If geography is a study of the difference space 
makes, Kant can certainly lay claim to being a geographer. Yet, on the other 
hand, Kant was writing at a time when there was the beginning of a 
noticeable shift away from the compilation of information and reports from a 
distance. In the early nineteenth century field-based science was in the 
ascendance, with the importance of trained eye-witness accounts, following 
pioneering studies of Alexander von Humboldt, Georges Cuvier, and 
somewhat earlier, the scientists involved with Cook’s voyages.70 
 
The Impure Physics and the Question of Race 
 
In his lectures on Logic, Kant suggests that there are four fundamental 
questions. 
 
1. ‘What can I know?’  
2. ‘What ought I to do?’  
3. ‘What may I hope?’  
4. ‘What is the human being?’ 
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Kant suggests that ‘Metaphysics answers the first question, morals the 
second, religion the third, and anthropology the fourth. Fundamentally, 
however, we could reckon all of this to anthropology, because the first three 
questions refer to the last one’.71 Just as these other realms of thought rest 
on the fundamental question, namely anthropology; so too do Kant’s 
reflections on the material world rest on the understanding of geography. For 
Kant, knowledge of the world is not pragmatic merely when it is ‘extensive 
knowledge of things in the world, for example, animals, plants and minerals 
from various lands and climates—but only when it contains knowledge of the 
human being as a citizen of the world’.72 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
distinguishes between nature and freedom, to which accord the natural law 
and the moral law. The first accords to everything that is; the second to what 
should be. He suggests that while both have separate systems, they can 
come together in a single philosophical system—his own critical philosophy. In 
this critical philosophy there is a pure philosophy of pure reason; but also an 
empirical element, and this for both nature and freedom.73 In the Geography 
lectures Kant begins by distinguishing between pure rational knowledge and 
knowledge from experience, through our senses.74 In other words, pragmatic 
anthropology is the relation of the human to the world, and is thus what 
Robert Louden calls ‘impure ethics’.75 Although much of the material in the 
geography lectures would also come under that remit—recall the origin of the 
anthropology lectures—we might make a case that much of the rest of the 
geography is ‘impure physics’, in other words the empirical detail that inhabits 
the categories of abstract thought. The use of this kind of detail is 
pronounced, for example, in Kant’s third critique, especially in the passages 
on teleological judgment.76 And in addition, while in his Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science Kant expresses the view that the empirical 
sciences require a pure grounding;77 his last work, the Opus Postumum, bears 
the title of ‘Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 
to Physics’.78 
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Thus while much of the detail of the Geography may be outdated and 
therefore of merely historical interest, Kant’s way of structuring geographical 
knowledge and its relation to his thought as a whole is of enduring 
importance. This importance lies both in the way he understands geography 
as a counterbalance to history, and in terms of the organization of knowledge. 
All perceived things are located in logical classifications such as those of 
Linnaeus; and in space and time. Logic deals with the first; physics with space 
and time, and of these, geography deals with space; history with time.79 Kant 
says that our experience of the world is limited in time—our limited lifespan—
and space—even if we have travelled extensively. So we must rely on others, 
who can provide us with either narrative (temporal, history) or description 
(spatial, geographical).80 Geography therefore allows us access to the 
ordering and categorizing of the world. Indeed, Kant distinguishes geography 
as the description of the whole world from topography as the description of 
single places and chorography as that of regions.81 Wilson thus suggests that 
the role is fundamentally different from a merely enumerative account of the 
world as it is. As she suggests physical geography in Kant’s terms ‘is not 
meant to be a description of the world as a scientist would view it, but rather 
geography is to be viewed in its purposiveness’.82 Thus for all their problems 
and their undoubted neglect, these lectures remain a key part of Kant’s work, 
and in recent years there has been some important discussion. The remainder 
of this essay will first discuss race—a theme treated at length in the various 
versions of the Geography; and then space, a topic which, while not 
extensively treated in the Geography, is key to any engagement with Kant’s 
geography in more general terms. 
 
The question of Kant’s racism has been discussed quite extensively in recent 
years. More challenging than his rehearsal of racial stereotypes and 
entertaining of prejudices is his theorisation of race. What this means is that 
Kant cannot simply be excused as a product of his time—trading on 
contemporary views about racial superiority and the like—because he went 
out of his way to explicitly theorise race, as a crucial category of human life. 
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The charges can be found in a series of essays by Robert Bernasconi.83 For 
Bernasconi Kant plays a significant role because he can be seen as the thinker 
who actually ‘invented the scientific concept of race’, as he was the thinker 
who ‘gave the first clear definition of it’.84 Indeed, Bernasconi contends that in 
doing so, he did not simply define race, but ‘played a crucial role in 
establishing the term ‘race’ as the currency within which discussions of human 
variety would be conducted in the nineteenth century’.85 Bernasconi’s 
phrasing is telling: ‘Kant opened up a new space for thinking: he took it into 
new territory’. While Kant may have stopped there, ‘those who came after 
him worked in the space he opened up’.86 Some responses have contended 
that this does not affect Kant’s broader thought, and that Kant’s arguments 
are stronger than his prejudices.87 But this is insufficient for Bernasconi. He 
suggests that there is a different between analytic and Continental philosophy 
in terms of their treatment of the biography of thinkers. Analytic is defined as 
‘a form of thinking that leaves no room for synthesis, holism or dialectic’.88 
While the geographies and histories of this distinction are problematic, as he 
recognizes, there is some profit in the divide for analysis. For Bernasconi the 
analytical approach to philosophy, which tends to be ahistorical in its reading 
of canonical thinkers, means that: 
 
The racism of a philosopher is easily put to one side. Kant’s 
racism does not raise a question for his cosmopolitanism 
because cosmopolitanism can be defined in such a way as to 
exclude racism. Thus, the fact that Kant was a racist has no 
implications for contemporary Kantians. However, things are 
somewhat different for Continental philosophers.89 
 
Given that the fundamental philosophical influence in contemporary 
geography is from the ‘Continental’ strand, this is of crucial importance. 
 
One of the few geographers who has recognized the implications of this 
challenge has been David Harvey. In a series of publications Harvey has 
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related the geography lectures to the contemporary interest in Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism,90 suggesting, like Bernasconi, that the claims of the lectures 
render this particular concept deeply problematic. Harvey notes that many 
Kantians want to dismiss the work on geography as ‘‘irrelevant’, ‘not to be 
taken seriously’’ or [suggest that] it ‘lacks interest'‘.91 In this position they are 
close to the oft-quoted remark from Benno Erdmann, who described the 
Anthropology as the ‘laborious compilation of a seventy-four year old man as 
he stood on the threshold of decrepitude’.92 For Harvey ‘the content of Kant’s 
Geography is nothing short of an intellectual and political embarrassment’.93 
Both aspects of this assessment might be encapsulated by Kant’s claim that 
‘humanity has its highest perfection in the white race’, with ‘yellow’, ‘Negro’ 
and ‘red’ races at respectively lower rungs.94  
 
In his 1755 book Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens Kant 
had displayed the same penchant for dubious scientific reasoning, uncritical 
adoption of other material and wild speculation that was to characterize his 
geography lectures beginning the next year. In particular, Kant speculates on 
the inhabitants of Mercury and Venus, suggesting that their bodily 
constitution is such that they could not dwell on earth. In addition those 
planets like earth and Mars are midway in the planetary system and therefore 
their inhabitants are balanced, whereas those of Mercury and Venus are 
stupid, weak, unable to submit to justice, and coarse in body.95 As David Clark 
suggests, this ‘functions as a barely displaced allegory of Europe’s close 
encounters with Africa and other equatorial regions of the universe’.96 This 
text might be considered as an early work, unimportant and tangential to 
Kant’s mature philosophical edifice. The same cannot be said of the lectures 
on geography, which extended until his retirement, and, from the available 
transcripts never ceased to discuss race and racial ideas. 
 
Harvey is right to suggest that there is much material that is offensive, 
embarrassing and irrelevant in the lectures, and makes a compelling case for 
the difficulties in accepting Kant’s ethical views in their wake. These views 
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cannot be swept away, disassociated from the thought people want to 
salvage. In Harvey’s account, there is a direct linkage between the expression 
of these ideas and the philosophical architecture erected on top of the 
Weltkenntnis. Harvey is right that the responses of traditional Kantians are 
inadequate, but over recent years there has been the beginning of some 
interest in these issues. While there are a number of Kantians who remain in 
denial, both on race and Geography, there are others who have risen to a 
challenge to think both in the context of his work as a whole. In part this has 
been a by-product of important studies of the Anthropology, but more 
generally there are now philosophers who have taken Kant’s geography 
seriously, which is not to say uncritically.  
 
Louden is a good example of this tendency. He stresses the teleological 
aspects of Kant’s theory of race, which implies that ‘racial characteristics are 
present in the human species because they help us reach our collective 
destiny’,97 that is they come out depending on climatic and landscape 
features—a form of geographical determinism. What this means is that Kant is 
arguing for a theory of race as monogenetic rather than polygenetic, as 
proposed by contemporaries, such as Lord Kames in 1774. Kames suggested 
that different races were different species, from different origins, whereas 
monogenism is the belief that humans are all ultimately related, stemming 
from some common ancestor. While more traditional biblical accounts stress 
monogenism—based on the lineage through Adam—accounts at the time 
began to stress the distinctions of the races. Kant thus believes in the 
ultimate unity of the human species, rather than being like those racial 
thinkers who thought that different origins implied inequality.98 But this is not 
to defend Kant, as he did say some deeply unpleasant things about race, 
which in Louden’s balanced judgment means that earlier views—such as that 
of Ernst Cassirer that Kant was progressive, ‘humanitarian’ and ‘equalitarian’, 
and distinct from Gobineau—need to be discarded.99 For Louden, ‘not all of 
Kant’s ideas about race are entirely ‘humanitarian’ and ‘equalitarian’, and the 
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gap between Gobineau and Kant is unfortunately not always as wide as one 
would like it to be’.100 
 
Given the way that race is the link between the Anthropology and the 
Geography, its minimal role in the former is perhaps somewhat surprising.101 
As Wilson suggests, ‘the anthropology begins where physical geography ends; 
the different climates and environments, explored in physical geography, 
explain the different kinds of human beings in the world, but the inner germs 
and natural predispositions, explored in anthropology, explain why the human 
being can adapt itself to the different climates and environments’.102 Indeed, 
Kant separated out from the Physical Geography course much of what he calls 
‘moral geography’, that is that which concerns the ‘customs and characters’ of 
different peoples.103 But in the published version of the Anthropology Kant 
says little, and suggests that the observations on the relation of physiognomy 
to race ‘belong more to physical geography than pragmatic anthropology’.104 
He does say more in the Geography. This has led Louden to propose the 
intriguing possibility that the older Kant may have come to doubt some of his 
views on race, which is why they are so brief in the Anthropology, which he 
edited, and more extensive in the Geography, based on older materials and 
not edited until Kant was too old to proofread the manuscript.105 But as 
Louden notes, there is not the evidence to determine this, and those 
materials Kant did publish on race (from 1775, 1777, 1785 and 1788) tend to 
confirm the worst.106 Suggesting that it was after the 1788 essay he changed 
his mind is the last resort, with Kleingeld arguing that Kant changed his views 
in the 1790s, and probably after 1792.107 But we should note that the 1798 
edition of the Anthropology makes reference to Christoph Girtanner’s Über 
das Kantische Prinzip für die Naturgeschichte, a work he saw as ‘presented so 
beautifully and thoroughly… (in accordance with my principles)’.108 
 
Thus Kant’s politics are rendered deeply suspect. For geographers this may 
appear relatively unimportant in itself—Kant is hardly alone in the tradition for 
this—but the contemporary resonances are hard to escape. Yet while almost 
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anyone today would share his rejection of the lectures’ reactionary attitudes, 
this does not mean that the lectures are without value. Geographers have 
long tried to separate the discipline and its questions from its imperial legacy 
and the answers from that time and space. Indeed, it is precisely because we 
need to trace political ruptures that we need to think historically. 
 
Space: Reassessing Kant’s Geography 
 
It is another rupture that may lead to the more important critique: that while 
we think we know Kant’s view of space, the account Kant offers of space in 
the work on geography and, more importantly, elsewhere, is at odds with this 
received wisdom. Thus this final section moves beyond the Geography to 
begin to reassess Kant’s geography more generally. Kant’s position within the 
discipline of geography is too often reduced to a caricature, again more often 
cited than read.  
 
Kant, it is generally supposed, held a view of space that was totalising, based 
on Cartesian geometry, absolute in the Newtonian sense. Thus we find a 
range of adjectival pairings common: Kantian space is Cartesian, Newtonian, 
and sometimes even more ahistorically Euclidean. Certainly in Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason, in the section on the transcendental aesthetic, space and 
time are pure intuitions, effectively hardwired into our brains, our very way of 
perceiving the world, rather than attributes of it. Space and time are thus the 
way that we experience, forms of sensibility, not experienced as such. The 
relation of this to Descartes’ and Newton’s view of the material world is more 
complicated than a simple equation, but this is certainly not an open system. 
 
Nonetheless Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his mature views on space 
were explicitly directed at challenging a pure Newtonian conception of space. 
To assert this does not mean that Kant’s view of space is something that 
geographers today would want to, or should, adopt. But they should surely 
know better what they are arguing against. His earlier writings had been 
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closer to a relational view, much influenced by Leibniz. But Kant’s critical turn 
is not entirely against this perspective. As noted above, Kant’s mature views 
on space were first presented in his 1770 Inaugural Dissertation, and here he 
attempts to mediate between a Leibnizian relative view of space—space is a 
product of the relations between things—and a Newtonian absolute view—
space is the container for things.109  
 
Back in 1969, in Explanation in Geography,110 Harvey discussed Kant in a 
rather different register to his more recent work on the question of race and 
cosmopolitanism. Then, as now, Harvey is deeply suspect of Kant’s absolute 
view of space. Harvey suggests that the absolute view of space needs to be 
understood, but alongside it we also need to view and understand space as 
relative and relational. Even given the caveat above, Kant might seem to be a 
long way from that position. But Harvey in Explanation in Geography offers 
what might be an intriguing possibility. This is when he suggests that Kant’s 
view of space is one in which ‘spatial magnitude is… only a measure of the 
intensity of acting forces exerted by the substance’.111 Harvey then concludes 
his analysis: 
 
Such a view of space is contrary to the view on which Kant 
based his philosophy of geography. Thus space is no longer 
something which can encompass our perceptions of the world. 
It is, rather, a collection of measures determined by our 
perceptions. If space and matter can no longer be effectively 
separated and if the properties of space can no longer be 
regarded as given a priori, the logical justification for the 
particular view of geography adopted by Kant, Hettner, and 
Hartshorne, can no longer be sustained.112 
 
Harvey’s source for the view of Kant on ‘spatial magnitude’ is Max Jammer’s 
important study Concepts of Space. In the quotation from Jammer, the 
analysis is of Kant’s 1755 and 1756 writings. Jammer actually provides a 
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nuanced account of how Kant moved from a more Leibnizian view in those 
earlier works, to a more Newtonian view around 1769, under the influence of 
Leonhard Euler.113 In 1769 Kant tries to show that ‘absolute space, 
independent of the existence of all matter and as itself the ultimate 
foundation of the compound character of matter, has a reality of its own’.114 
Kant thus moved, on this account, from a relative view of space to an 
absolute one. But he does not rest there. As Jammer convincingly claims, 
Kant further worked on the view of space that he held, and by the Inaugural 
Dissertation of 1770 he had reached a different view, attempting to reconcile 
these positions. 
 
The concepts of absolute space and absolute time are 
considered to be mere conceptual fictions, a mental scheme of 
coexistence and sequence among sense particulars. Not itself 
arising out of sensations, the concept of space is a pure 
intuition, neither objective nor real, but subjective and ideal.115 
 
This therefore forms the view of space that is well known in Kant, where 
there are two pure intuitions—space and time—that structure all that we 
experience about the world. In Jammer’s words, space ‘is not an object of 
perception, it is a mode of perceiving objects’.116 
 
Briefly, and necessarily crudely, a return to the Critique of Pure Reason is 
helpful here. Kant suggests that space is an object of outer sense, and time of 
inner sense.117 Space then is as geography is, an element of the external 
world alone, whereas time is both of the external and internal.118 Kant then 
poses the questions he aims to address: 
 
Now what are space and time? Are they actual entities? Are they 
only determinations or relations of things, yet ones that would 
pertain to them even if they were not intuited, or are they 
relations that only attach to the form of intuition alone, and thus 
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to the subjective constitution of our mind, without which these 
predicates could not be ascribed to any thing at all.119 
 
Kant then suggests that space must be understood as a representation, thus 
leading him to talk of a representation of space. It is a priori, prior to 
experience, and the necessary condition for it, ‘the ground of all intuitions… 
the condition of possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent 
on them’.120 In a marginal note he added that ‘space is not a concept, but an 
intuition’.121 It is in this sense, and this sense alone, that time is ‘something 
real, namely the real form of inner intuition’.122 In another note Kant adds a 
crucial addition: ‘So is space. This proves that here a reality (consequently 
also individual intuition) is given, which yet always grounds the reality as a 
thing. Space and time do not belong to the reality of things, but only to our 
representations’.123 
 
In the first edition (1781) the point about magnitude is therefore the reverse 
of the earlier claim cited by Harvey from Jammer. Kant claims that ‘space is 
represented as a given infinite magnitude. A general concept of space can 
determine nothing in respect to magnitude’.124 In the second edition (1787) 
he slightly alters the formulation: ‘Space is represented as an infinite given 
magnitude… Therefore the original representation of space is an a priori 
intuition, not a concept’.125 This leads to the essentially important claim: ‘we 
can accordingly speak of space, extended beings, and so on, only from the 
human standpoint’.126 A separate 1786 essay on orientation, that is literally, 
finding the sunrise in the sky, Kant notes that ‘even with all the objective data 
of the sky, I orient myself geographically only through a subjective ground of 
differentiation’.127 Space and time are thus not absolute in anything like a 
Newtonian sense, nor does Cartesian geometry tell us about the world as it is. 
Rather they are modes of access to the way the world appears to us. Kant 
therefore concludes in a note to his own edition: ‘space and time of course 
have objective reality, but not for what pertains to things outside of their 
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relation to a faculty of cognition, but rather only in relation to it, and thus to 
the form of sensibility, hence solely as appearances’.128 
 
Several points emerge from this. One is that Kant’s view of space (and time) 
undergoes some important developments, and that we need to be careful in 
taking claims in, and about, certain periods, as indicative of his thought as a 
whole. The second is that the Geography, given over several decades, is in 
part affected by these shifts. Preliminary investigations of the student 
transcripts indicate this: the Holstein-Beck from 1758-59 contains no 
theoretical discussion of space and time and their relation to geography and 
history; the courses from the mid 1770s have the more extensive introductory 
discussion drawn upon above (such as Kähler, which is the basis for the Rink 
edition introduction); whereas a course from the last years, such as the 
Wolter transcript from 1796, underplays the theoretical material but assumes 
its essential insights. Third, and most important, that Kant’s mature view—the 
one that emerges in 1770 and is the view of the Critique of Pure Reason, and  
arguably that of the majority of the geography lectures, is not an absolute 
view of space on the model of Descartes or Newton.129 The claim that Kant 
makes is that space, as this ‘conceptual fiction’, offers a way of insight into 
how we perceive the world, and is open to scientific examination, rather than 
this determination being necessarily representative of space itself. In many 
places Kant recognises that directions in space are a product of our body’s 
encounter with space rather than absolute and self-evident.  
 
In addition, as the work on space and time in the Geography indicates, Kant 
is trying to work the dimensions of space and time together. Kant surely does 
not advance the kind of historical-geographical materialism advocated by the 
likes of Harvey, or the ‘spatial history’ other geographers have suggested. But 
his separation of space and time is a product of theorising, when in practice—
either in our experience or in the relation of geographical details to historical 
studies—they are continually intertwined. 
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Conclusion 
 
Given the renewed interest in the Anthropology and the links this material has 
to the Geography, and the forthcoming translation of these lectures in the 
volume on Natural Science this seems an opportune moment to take stock of 
their historical importance and contemporary relevance. To read Kant’s work 
on geography is an inherently interdisciplinary venture, since they cover both 
human and physical geography and obviously relate to philosophical concerns. 
The issues raised by these texts of Kant’s are textual and linguistic, 
philological and hermeneutic, philosophical and political, even as we consider 
their relation to geography and the wider history of ideas. Only a multi-
disciplinary, and multi-handed, approach can do justice to their complexity.130 
For geographers these lectures have some fundamental challenges to offer. 
Most of it is indeed, as Hartshorne, following Adickes, suggested, of historical 
interest. This is the very reason why it is so interesting. If nothing else, this 
account offered here is to show just how many difficulties there are around 
the texts of Kant’s geographies and their meanings. The link to the 
anthropology lectures and the question of race is a fundamental concern, 
precisely because it is so deeply problematic, and because of the challenge 
Bernasconi and Harvey have thrown down to geographers and others who 
wish to appeal to Kant’s cosmopolitan instincts. More positively, and in part 
going beyond the Geography itself, there may be something of fundamental 
interest in the thinking of the relation between space and time, geography 
and history. This is not to co-opt Kant into arguments for the primacy of 
geography over history, nor for claims of their equal status in the study of 
social relations, but rather to recognise that the tradition of Western thought 
has not always had the imbalance it is often assumed to have had.  
 
The argument made here could easily be extended to suggest that the other 
important geographical issues, such as the relation between the human and 
the environment, and the link or distinction between the human and nature, 
might also be profitably be rethought from the perspective of a closer 
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engagement with Kant’s critical philosophy as a whole.131 It seems 
unquestionable, however, that a more nuanced understanding of these 
lectures and Kant’s work more generally can only be a good thing for the 
history of the discipline of geography. 
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